How Terrorist Groups End Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida

All terrorist groups eventually end. But how do they end? The evidence since 1968 indicates that most groups have ended because (1) they joined the political process (43 percent) or (2) local police and intelligence agencies arrested or killed key members (40 percent). Military force has rarely been...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Jones, Seth G. (auth)
Other Authors: Libicki, Martin C. (auth)
Format: Electronic Book Chapter
Language:English
Published: RAND Corporation 2008
Subjects:
Online Access:DOAB: download the publication
DOAB: description of the publication
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!

MARC

LEADER 00000naaaa2200000uu 4500
001 doab_20_500_12854_114774
005 20231005
003 oapen
006 m o d
007 cr|mn|---annan
008 20231005s2008 xx |||||o ||| 0|eng d
020 |a MG741RC 
020 |a 9780833046406 
020 |a 9780833044655 
040 |a oapen  |c oapen 
024 7 |a 10.7249/MG741RC  |c doi 
041 0 |a eng 
042 |a dc 
072 7 |a JPS  |2 bicssc 
072 7 |a TTM  |2 bicssc 
100 1 |a Jones, Seth G.  |4 auth 
700 1 |a Libicki, Martin C.  |4 auth 
245 1 0 |a How Terrorist Groups End  |b Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida 
260 |b RAND Corporation  |c 2008 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a computer  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a online resource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
506 0 |a Open Access  |2 star  |f Unrestricted online access 
520 |a All terrorist groups eventually end. But how do they end? The evidence since 1968 indicates that most groups have ended because (1) they joined the political process (43 percent) or (2) local police and intelligence agencies arrested or killed key members (40 percent). Military force has rarely been the primary reason for the end of terrorist groups, and few groups within this time frame have achieved victory. This has significant implications for dealing with al Qa?ida and suggests fundamentally rethinking post-9/11 U.S. counterterrorism strategy: Policymakers need to understand where to prioritize their efforts with limited resources and attention. The authors report that religious terrorist groups take longer to eliminate than other groups and rarely achieve their objectives. The largest groups achieve their goals more often and last longer than the smallest ones do. Finally, groups from upper-income countries are more likely to be left-wing or nationalist and less likely to have religion as their motivation. The authors conclude that policing and intelligence, rather than military force, should form the backbone of U.S. efforts against al Qa?ida. And U.S. policymakers should end the use of the phrase ?war on terrorism? since there is no battlefield solution to defeating al Qa?ida. 
540 |a All rights reserved  |4 http://oapen.org/content/about-rights 
546 |a English 
650 7 |a International relations  |2 bicssc 
650 7 |a Military engineering  |2 bicssc 
653 |a Political Science 
653 |a Technology 
856 4 0 |a www.oapen.org  |u https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/MG741RC  |7 0  |z DOAB: download the publication 
856 4 0 |a www.oapen.org  |u https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/114774  |7 0  |z DOAB: description of the publication