The Political Economy of Sovereign Default
What do self-interested governments' needs to maintain loyal groups of supporters imply for sovereign incentives to repay debt? Many sovereign defaults have occurred at relatively low levels of debt, while some highly indebted nations continue to honour their obligations. This poses a problem f...
সংরক্ষণ করুন:
| প্রধান লেখক: | |
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| বিন্যাস: | বৈদ্যুতিক গ্রন্থের অধ্যায় |
| ভাষা: | ইংরেজি |
| প্রকাশিত: |
Graduate Institute Publications
2012
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| বিষয়গুলি: | |
| অনলাইন ব্যবহার করুন: | DOAB: download the publication DOAB: description of the publication |
| ট্যাগগুলো: |
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| সংক্ষিপ্ত: | What do self-interested governments' needs to maintain loyal groups of supporters imply for sovereign incentives to repay debt? Many sovereign defaults have occurred at relatively low levels of debt, while some highly indebted nations continue to honour their obligations. This poses a problem for traditional models of sovereign debt, which rely on the threat of economic sanctions to explain why and when a representative agent seeking to maximise social welfare would choose debt-repayment. The... |
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| আইসবিএন: | 9782940503070 9782940503087 |
| প্রবেশাধিকার: | Open Access |