Stability of cooperation in the international climate negotiations - An analysis using cooperative game theory
International cooperation on greenhouse gas emission reductions is needed to avoid dangerous climate change. This work analyses the stability of global cooperation on climate change using cooperative game theory. Numerical and theoretical models are applied to evaluate the impact of several real-wor...
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Autor principal: | |
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Formato: | Electrónico Capítulo de libro |
Lenguaje: | inglés |
Publicado: |
KIT Scientific Publishing
2017
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | DOAB: download the publication DOAB: description of the publication |
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Sumario: | International cooperation on greenhouse gas emission reductions is needed to avoid dangerous climate change. This work analyses the stability of global cooperation on climate change using cooperative game theory. Numerical and theoretical models are applied to evaluate the impact of several real-world properties. It is shown that the introduction of these properties into the game-theoretical model substantially affects the results and can make global climate cooperation unstable. |
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Descripción Física: | 1 electronic resource (XXII, 221 p. p.) |
ISBN: | KSP/1000072088 9783731507000 |
Acceso: | Open Access |