Chapter 7 Socializing Responsibility

There is a near universal consensus that the bearers of moral responsibility are the individuals we identify with proper names. I suggest that if we take the exercise of agency as a guide to the identification of agents, we may find that agents sometimes extend into the world: they may be constitute...

Volledige beschrijving

Bewaard in:
Bibliografische gegevens
Hoofdauteur: Levy, Neil (auth)
Formaat: Elektronisch Hoofdstuk
Taal:Engels
Gepubliceerd in: Oxford Oxford University Press 2018
Onderwerpen:
Online toegang:DOAB: download the publication
DOAB: description of the publication
Tags: Voeg label toe
Geen labels, Wees de eerste die dit record labelt!

MARC

LEADER 00000naaaa2200000uu 4500
001 doab_20_500_12854_70143
005 20210601
003 oapen
006 m o d
007 cr|mn|---annan
008 20210601s2018 xx |||||o ||| 0|eng d
040 |a oapen  |c oapen 
041 0 |a eng 
042 |a dc 
072 7 |a HP  |2 bicssc 
100 1 |a Levy, Neil  |4 auth 
245 1 0 |a Chapter 7 Socializing Responsibility 
260 |a Oxford  |b Oxford University Press  |c 2018 
300 |a 1 electronic resource (20 p.) 
336 |a text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a computer  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a online resource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
506 0 |a Open Access  |2 star  |f Unrestricted online access 
520 |a There is a near universal consensus that the bearers of moral responsibility are the individuals we identify with proper names. I suggest that if we take the exercise of agency as a guide to the identification of agents, we may find that agents sometimes extend into the world: they may be constituted by several individuals and/or by institutions. These extended agents may be responsible for morally significant outcomes. I argue that institutions or extended agents may also be responsible for the failure of individuals to satisfy the epistemic conditions on moral responsibility. Individuals may believe virtuously but falsely, due to the way in which cues to reliability are socially distributed. I conclude by suggesting that a focus on individual responsibility may have distracted us from the urgent task of reforming the institutional actors responsible for widespread ignorance about morally significant facts. 
536 |a Wellcome Trust 
540 |a Creative Commons  |f https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/  |2 cc  |4 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 
546 |a English 
650 7 |a Philosophy  |2 bicssc 
653 |a moral responsibility; socializing responsibility 
773 1 0 |t Social Dimensions of Moral Responsibility  |7 nnaa  |o OAPEN Library UUID: 8d231443-e153-4e6b-9f4f-028b4d0da8c2 
856 4 0 |a www.oapen.org  |u https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/20.500.12657/48872/1/Bookshelf_NBK513458.pdf  |7 0  |z DOAB: download the publication 
856 4 0 |a www.oapen.org  |u https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/70143  |7 0  |z DOAB: description of the publication