Participation in a Public Insurance Program: Subsidies, Crowd-Out, and Adverse Selection
This paper examines how varying the level of subsidies affects participation in a public insurance program, crowd-out of private insurance, and adverse selection. We study the experience in Washington's Basic Health program in 1997. Findings show that adverse selection is not a problem in volun...
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Main Authors: | Stephen H. Long (Author), M. Susan Marquis (Author) |
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Format: | Book |
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SAGE Publishing,
2002-08-01T00:00:00Z.
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Online Access: | Connect to this object online. |
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