Chapter 4 Against Unconscious Volition

• Hoofdauteur: Bayne, Tim (auth)
• Formaat: Elektronisch Hoofdstuk
• Taal: Engels
• Gepubliceerd in: Taylor & Francis 2024
• Onderwerpen: Philosophy of mind; Psychology; Cognition & cognitive psychology; attention; higher-order theories of consciousness; inattentional blindness; masking; mental qualities; neurophenomenal structuralism; phenomenal content; unconscious mental states
• Online toegang: OAPEN Library: download the publication; OAPEN Library: description of the publication

Samenvatting

This chapter examines the question of whether mental categories come in both conscious and unconscious forms, focusing on the case of volition. Drawing out the implications of the fact that volition is a personal-level phenomenon, an argument against the possibility of unconscious volition is developed. Three objections to that argument are then considered: the first appeals to minimal actions and the exercise of expertise; the second appeals to Benjamin Libet's studies regarding the Readiness Potential; and the third appeals to relational conceptions of consciousness. All three arguments are found to be uncompelling. The chapter concludes by revisiting the question of whether mental categories can, in general, take both conscious and unconscious forms.

Fysieke beschrijving

1 electronic resource (20 p.)

ISBN

9781003409526- 5
9781032529790
9781032529745

Toegang

Open Access