Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak
Draws upon information derived primarily from interviews with and interrogations of senior Iraqi military and civilian officials to examine why the Iraqi resistance in March and April 2003 was so weak. It focuses on two questions: (1) Why did the Iraqi Regular Army and Republican Guard forces do so...
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1. Verfasser: | Hosmer, Stephen T. (auth) |
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Format: | Elektronisch Buchkapitel |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Veröffentlicht: |
RAND Corporation
2007
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Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | DOAB: download the publication DOAB: description of the publication |
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