Chapter The Price of Uncertainty in Present-Biased Planning
The tendency to overestimate immediate utility is a common cognitive bias. As a result people behave inconsistently over time and fail to reach long-term goals. Behavioral economics tries to help affected individuals by implementing external incentives. However, designing robust incentives is often...
সংরক্ষণ করুন:
প্রধান লেখক: | |
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অন্যান্য লেখক: | |
বিন্যাস: | বৈদ্যুতিক গ্রন্থের অধ্যায় |
ভাষা: | ইংরেজি |
প্রকাশিত: |
Springer Nature
2017
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বিষয়গুলি: | |
অনলাইন ব্যবহার করুন: | OAPEN Library: download the publication OAPEN Library: description of the publication |
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সংক্ষিপ্ত: | The tendency to overestimate immediate utility is a common cognitive bias. As a result people behave inconsistently over time and fail to reach long-term goals. Behavioral economics tries to help affected individuals by implementing external incentives. However, designing robust incentives is often difficult due to imperfect knowledge of the parameter β ∈ (0, 1] quantifying a person's present bias. Using the graphical model of Kleinberg and Oren [8], we approach this problem from an algorithmic perspective. Based on the assumption that the only information about β is its membership in some set B ⊂ (0, 1], we distinguish between two models of uncertainty: one in which β is fixed and one in which it varies over time. As our main result we show that the conceptual loss of effi- ciency incurred by incentives in the form of penalty fees is at most 2 in the former and 1 + max B/ min B in the latter model. We also give asymptotically matching lower bounds and approximation algorithms. |
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দৈহিক বর্ননা: | 1 electronic resource (15 p.) |
আইসবিএন: | 978-3-319-71924-5_23 |
প্রবেশাধিকার: | Open Access |