The Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box Electoral Manipulation, Economic Maneuvering, and Political Order in Autocracies

• Autore principale: Higashijima, Masaaki (auth)
• Natura: Elettronico Capitolo di libro
• Lingua: inglese
• Pubblicazione: University of Michigan Press 2022
• Serie: Weiser Center for Emerging Democracies
• Soggetti: Politics & government; Elections & referenda; Political structures: democracy; Asian history; election, autocracy, dictatorship, electoral fraud, electoral system, electoral reform, electoral manipulation, economic policy, political business cycles, fiscal policy, coup, protest, opposition, distributive politics, Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, developing country, democratization, regime change, natural resource, oil, state capacity, dominant party, Nursultan Nazarbaev, Askar Akaev
• Accesso online: OAPEN Library: download the publication; OAPEN Library: download the publication; OAPEN Library: description of the publication

Riassunto

Contrary to our stereotypical views, dictators often introduce elections in which they refrain from employing blatant electoral fraud. Why do electoral reforms happen in autocracies? Do these elections destabilize autocratic rule? The Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box argues that strong autocrats who can garner popular support become less dependent on coercive electioneering strategies. When autocrats fail to design elections properly, elections backfire in the form of coups, protests, and the opposition's stunning election victories. The book's theoretical implications are tested on a battery of cross-national analyses with newly collected data on autocratic elections and in-depth comparative case studies of the two Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

Descrizione fisica

1 electronic resource (366 p.)

ISBN

mpub.11978139
9780472075317
9780472055319
9780472220083

Accesso

Open Access